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Distribution of Underwriting Surplus and Investment Profit from Tabarru’ Fund:  Shariah 
Contracts Applied and Current Market Practice 
Ahmad Basri Ibrahim, Ahmad Fadhil Hamdi Mohd Ali, Mohd Hafizal Elias, Wan Ahmad Najib Wan Ahmad Lotfi 
International Islamic University Malaysia 
 
Abstract 
Takaful is a contract whereby the participants commit to contribute an amount on regular basis or in 
one lump sum in a specified fund to mutually guarantee each other and appoint a body to act as the fund 
manager. In this contract, Takaful participants have the opportunity to mitigate the possible financial risk 
that their families might encounter in case of misfortune. The contribution then will be placed into 
respective participant‟s account or also known as Participants‟ Investment Fund (PIF). The fund manager, 
i.e. Takaful operator will drip from every PIF an amount on the basis of donation into a collective 
Participants‟ Risk Fund (PRF) or known as Tabarru‟ Fund.  This fund does not belong to the 
Takafuloperator; it‟s rather owned bythe participants. The Takaful operator only manages the fund on 
behalf of the participants. Being a fund, money in it is also invested and would possibly generate profit. 
At the same time, with proper management of the Tabarru‟ fund, it might produce surplus after payment 
of claims at the end of financial year. There are several Shariah views and methods on the treatment of the 
investment profit and underwriting surplus generated from the fund. These views differ from one to 
another depending on the contracts adopted, which ultimately would define the permissibility of sharing 
the profit and the surplus between related parties. In Malaysia, the sharing of underwriting surplus is 
allowed according to the resolution passed by Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia) subject 
to the certainguidelines.  All eleven (11) Takaful operators in Malaysia have different practices in 
distributing the surplus and profit with respect to Shariah contracts applied and operational treatments. 
This research will study these differences and provide recommendations on the issues identified. 
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Introduction  
Takaful refers to cooperation among a group of individuals to mutually guarantee and aid 
each other in order to meet certain needs as agreed amongst them, such as providing 
compensation for a particular loss or any other kind of financial needs
*
. This cooperation usually 
will be entrusted to a Takaful operator to safeguard these individuals‟ interest as participants. 
After an underwriter of the Takaful operator approves the risk borne by the participant, the 
participant will contribute a sum of money into Participant‟s Investment Fund (PIF) which 
subsequently a portion of it will be dripped to Participants‟ Risk Fund (PRF or also known as 
tabarru‟ fund) as agreed. At the end of each financial year, the appointed actuary will assess the 
status of the PRF whether there is surplus or deficit.  
The status of the fund will be announced after each financial year end closing. If the status 
is deficit, unallocated surplus i.e. contingency reserve from the past year will be utilized to cover 
the deficit. In Malaysia, if the reserve is still insufficient to cover the deficit, Central Bank of 
Malaysiaor also known as Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) has obliged the Takaful operator to 
give qardhasan (benevolent loan) to PRF. Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 (IFSA) has 
captured this obligation in paragraph 95
†
 which says,  
“Where the value of the asset of the Takaful fund is less than the value specified 
…, the licensed Takaful operator shall provide qard or other forms of financial 
support to the Takaful fund from the shareholders‟ fund for an amount and on 
such terms and conditions as may be specified by the bank.” 
 
                                                          
*Shariah Resolution in Islamic Finance, p.62. 
†Islamic Financial Services Act 2013, p 63. 
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If there is surplus, BNM has made it clear via its BNM Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) 
resolution thatthe Takaful operator can share the surplus withparticipants.  
 
Takaful Model 
Below is an example of a family Takaful model used in the industry which adopts a hybrid 
of wakalah and ju‟alah (with sharing of underwriting surplus): 
 
 
Diagram 1: Example of a Wakalah-Ju‟alah Family Takaful Model in Malaysia 
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Based on the model, participant will give his/her commitment to contribute to the fund 
according to the risk carried. The contribution made will be deducted first as upfront charge 
before going into PIF. The upfront charge is a wakalah fee which is payable because of the 
services and expertise that will be provided by Takaful operator. This is where the contract of 
wakalah bi al-ujrah takes place.  
The money in PIF will then be dripped into PRF. All of the money in PIF and PRF will be 
invested in Shariah-compliant portfolios. In this model, the contract used for investment is 
wakalah bi al-istithmar. To invest on behalf of participants, the Takaful operator can charge the 
participants for the fund management services rendered. In the model above, Takaful operator 
charge its customer with a Fund Management Charge (FMC). At the end of the financial year, 
100% of the investment profit will be given and credited into PIF.  
The Shariah concept applicable would be as follows
‡
: 
i. Tabarru‟: The amount of donation that the participants willingly relinquish in order to 
help each other in the event of misfortunes. 
ii. Wakalah bi al-Ujrah: The contract of agency where: 
 Participant authorizes the Takaful operator to manage PRF on behalf of him/her. 
 The Takaful operator will invest the monies in accordance to wakalah bi al-
istithmarprinciple. 
The Takaful operator is entitled to receive the fees as agreed at the beginning of the 
contract upon the services rendered. 
                                                          
‡Great Eastern Takaful Berhad.Product Disclosure Sheet, p 1. 
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iii. Ju‟alah: Literally, it means compensation for a given service. Legally, it is a contract for 
performing a given task against a prescribed fee in a given period. Ju‟alahconcept is used 
in a situation where underwriting surplus is shared among the participants and the 
Takaful operator. Entitlement to underwriting surplus depends on a completion of work 
and delivery of result. 
iv. Qard Hasan (Benevolent Loan): A loan which is returned at the end of the agreed period 
without any interest or share in the profit or loss of the business. For the purpose of 
Takaful, in the event of deficit in the PRF, Takaful operator will arrange for qardhasan. 
The qardhasanis repayable from the future underwriting surplus of the PRF. 
 
As a comparison to model above, the following is an example of a family Takaful model in 
the industry that adopts a hybrid of wakalah and mudarabah (without sharing of underwriting 
surplus): 
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Diagram 2: Example of a Wakalah-Mudarabah Family Takaful Model in Malaysia 
There are two differences between this model and the former which are: 
i. Investment profit sharing from PRF. 
The former model does not share profit because it is based on wakalah bi al-istithmar 
where they have enjoyed the FMC. Meanwhile, the latter model does share investment 
profit from PRF on the basis of mudarabah. International Shari‟ah Research Academy 
for Islamic Finance (ISRA) defines mudarabah
§
as a type of partnership for profit in 
which one partner provides capital and the other partner contributes his labour. The profit 
will be shared between them according to the terms that they have mutually agreed. 
ii. Sharing of underwriting surplus 
                                                          
§ ISRA Compendium For Islamic Financial Terms, pp 288-289. 
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The former model does share underwriting surplus on the basis of ju‟alah, meanwhile, 
the latter model does not share underwriting surplus despite the fact that the Takaful 
operator can actually include it in the contract in the first place. 
 
To understand underwriting surplus, we must first understand underwriting. In addition to 
that, we also need to clarify who is the person that is entitled to the investment profit generated 
from PRF. 
 
Definition of Underwriting, Underwriting Surplus and the status of Investment Profit in 
PRF 
Definition of Underwriting 
Underwriting in the Takaful business is the process of selecting, assessing and classifying 
the degrees of risk of an applicant for the purpose of granting coverage in exchange for a 
contribution
**
. The definition is not entirely accurate with regards to the usage of the term 
“exchange”. In reality, Takaful is not a mu‟awadat (exchange) contract, but it is a type of 
voluntary donation.  
Hence, the suitable definition will be, “the process of selecting, assessing and classifying 
the degrees of risk of an applicant for the purpose of granting coverage to the applicant who will 
contribute to the risk pool” by keeping silence on the “exchange” term.  
                                                          
** Takaful: Realities and Challenges, p 291. 
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The layman understanding of underwriting is applicant have to pass underwriting first if 
he/she wants to be a participant in a Takaful contract. Among the reasons that an applicant is 
declined to participate in a Takaful scheme would be his/her health conditions such as high Body 
Mass Index (BMI), existing critical illness and it might also be due to regulatory requirements 
such as Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act. 
There is also a concept that we refer to as “degree of underwriting”. If a Takaful operator is 
being prudent and adopts a stringent underwriting philosophy to protect the tabarru‟ fund, it is 
likely that less claim will happen, resulting in underwriting surplus from PRF at the end of a 
financial year. But if the Takaful operator takes an aggressive approach, there is a high 
possibility that the PRF will suffer underwriting deficit. 
 
Underwriting Surplus 
Underwriting surplus is a surplus; it is not a profit. Investopedia defines surplus as the 
amount of an asset or resource that exceeds the portion that is utilized
††
. Hence, surplus is not a 
result from investment activity, but rather, unutilized resource, such as underwriting surplus.  
 
The Status of Investment Profit in PRF 
Although the primary function of PRF is to honour claim, PRF is also being invested. 
Takaful operators being financial institutions; it will be a waste of opportunity if they do not 
invest the participants‟ money. Although PRF is a separate fund, the fund is still owned by 
participants, likewise its derived profit. 
 
                                                          
†† Retrieved from http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/surplus.asp on 18 Nov 2014 
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Views of Proponent and Opponent on Surplus Sharing and Profit Distribution 
BNM through its SAC, in its 42
nd
, 59
th
 and 62
nd
 meeting dated 25 March 2004, 25 May 
2006 and 4 October 2006 respectively resolved
‡‡
 that:  
i. Surplus from participants‟ risk fund may be distributed amongst the participants and the 
Takafulcompany. 
ii. For Takaful model based on wakalah concept, the risk fund surplus may be taken by the 
Takaful fund manager as a performance fee based on an agreed percentage. 
iii. For Takaful model based on mudarabah concept, the surplus from participants‟ risk fund 
may be shared between the participants and Takafulcompany based on percentage or 
profit sharing ratio as agreed by all contracting parties. 
 
It is understood from the above that the Shariah contracts used in surplus sharing is 
eitherju‟alah or mudarabah. 
The practice of surplus sharing is not widely accepted internationally, especially in the 
Gulf Countries. Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions
§§
 
(AAOIFI) has issued a standard in its Shari‟a Standard No. 26 on Islamic insurance, under 
statement no. 5/5, AAOIFI has stressed that the managing company is not entitled to any share of 
the surplus
***
. 
In terms of profit distribution, AAOIFI has kept silent on its opinions and resolution. 
Nevertheless, SAC of BNM did pass a resolution on profit distribution from PRF, apart from 
surplus distribution. 
                                                          
‡‡Shariah Resolutions in Islamic Finance 2010, p 78. 
§§ Based in Bahrain, is an Islamic non-profit corporate body that prepares among others accounting and Shariah standards for 
Islamic financial institutions. 
***Shari‟a Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions, p 439. 
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SAC of BNM, in its 62
nd
 meeting dated 4 October 2006 resolved
†††
 that: 
i. A Takaful company is allowed to share or to impose fee or performance fee on the 
investment profits from participants‟ risk fund. 
ii. For Takaful model based on mudarabah, the Takafulcompany is allowed to share the 
profit. 
iii. Whereas for Takaful model based on wakalah, the Takafulcompany is allowed to charge 
a fee or performance fee on the investment profit of the participants‟ risk fund. 
 
This would mean that, for profit distribution; mudarabah, wakalah bi al-istithmarand 
ju‟alah would be applicable. However, the usage of ju‟alah contract (or performance fee) in 
investment activity is odd. This is because there would be no difference in terms of mudarabah 
and ju‟alah and it is not in line with the spirit of ju‟alah itself. 
 
Combined Distribution vs Separate Distribution 
After discussing the permissibility of distribution of surplus and profit between Takaful 
operator and participants, this section will discuss methods adopted by Takaful operators to 
distribute the profit and surplus. 
                                                          
†††Shariah Resolutions in Islamic Finance 2010, p 80. 
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There are differences in the methods adopted for surplus and profit distribution between 
Takaful operators depending on a Takaful operator‟s management decision. There are Takaful 
operators that combine the investment profit and the underwriting surplus first before distributing 
them, which is referred to as combined distribution. There are also cases where the investment 
profit and the underwriting surplus are distributed separately, which are referredto as separate 
distribution. 
Earlier in this paper, it is noted that underwriting surplus is not an investment profit. As 
such, some Takaful operators might want to revisit their practices in dealing with underwriting 
surplus so that they apply the right contract.  
 
Diagram 3: Issue of Distribution of Investment Profit from PRF 
If a Takaful operator adopts wakalah contract, the Takaful operator is not entitled to take 
any investment profit that arises but it is entitled to charge for investment management as 
wakalah fee. Al-Ju‟alah cannot be considered here because it is absurd to charge performance fee 
on investment profit. 
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The fundamental issue is where should the profit is channelled to? It is either to PRF or 
PIF? Based on the research conducted, investment profit should be channelled to PIF as long as 
Takaful operator has the operational capacity to do that. This is to avoid „double distribution‟ to 
Takaful operator, hence injustice to participants. 
In case the profit is channelled to PRF, the double distribution may occur if theTakaful 
operator has already charged wakalah fee upfront on investment management activities, and 
later, it also shares underwriting surplus whereby the investment profit is a part of surplus. 
For Takaful model that is based on mudarabah, it would be more adequate and accurate if 
mudarabahon profit sharing and mudarabahon surplus sharing are kept separately, in which the 
investment profit that emerged from PRF is channelled straight away to PIF, whereas the 
underwriting surplus is shared between the Takaful operator and the participants. 
 
Experience and Stance of Great Eastern Takaful Berhad (GETB) 
In the beginning of establishment of GETB, Shariah Unit of GETB did send a proposal 
paper to BNM in 2010 on surplus sharing, taking a stance that it is not permissible to share 
surplus based on these arguments: 
i. Iltizam bi at-Tabarru‟ (commitment to donate) 
The contribution that participants have paid is considered only a commitment, and not yet 
turned into donation. The contribution will turn into donation when it is been used to pay 
claims. Hence, surplus arising from PRF is still participants‟ money and Takaful operator 
should not take it. 
ii. Ratio of Underwriting 
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If Takaful operator wanted to take 50% of the underwriting surplus, the ratio would be 
50:50. At the same time, 0:100 is also still considered a ratio. If Takaful operator takes 
100%, there will be no difference between a Takaful operator and an insurer. 
iii. Application of Ju‟alah 
Malikites, Shafi‟ites and Hanbalites stipulate that in ju‟alah, the performance fee should 
be clearly stated in number, not only a ratio. Moreover, it is outside of 
theTakafuloperator‟s capability to ensure that they realize underwriting surplus because it 
is subject to number of claims that happened for the year, which is uncertain in nature. 
So, application of ju‟alah here is not suitable. 
iv. Prudency of Takaful operator 
Some might say that there is no harm to give Takaful operator a share in surplus to 
further motivate them to be prudent in ensuring capabilities of PRF to honour claims. 
However, BNM has already stipulated a qard arrangement from Takaful operator in case 
there is deficit in the PRF. Qard liability should be enough to motivate Takaful operator 
in being prudent. 
v. AAOIFIShariah Standards on sharing of underwriting surplus 
AAOIFI‟sresolution in 2010 has made clear that underwriting surplus is participants‟ 
money and shareholders of the Takaful operator cannot enjoy the surplus. 
Consequently, after the introduction of the Takaful Operational Framework guidelines by 
BNM which imposes new requirements, a thorough deliberation took place to revisit this 
decision. Taking into consideration various factors and discussions between related parties, 
GETB including its Shariah Committee and Shariah Unit agreed to allow surplus sharing.  
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This stance was made based on market practice in Malaysia and prudent guidelines from 
BNM on surplus sharing. On distribution of investment profit, it has been a practice of GETB to 
channel the profit from PRF to the PIF straight away. 
 
Current Market Practice 
A market research
‡‡‡
 had been conducted to see other Takaful operators‟ practice in 
distributing profit and surplus from PRF. The research findings as at December 2014 are as 
follows: 
No. 
Takaful 
Operator 
Practice of Takaful Operator in Regards to Surplus Sharing and 
Profit Distribution from PRF 
 
1. 
 
Takaful 
Operator A 
 
 Takaful Model: 1) Wakalah 2) Mudarabah 
 Shariah contract for surplus sharing: 1) Ju‟alah 2) Mudarabah 
 Shariah contract for profit distribution: 1) Ju‟alah 2) Mudarabah 
 Combined distribution 
 
2. 
 
Takaful 
Operator B 
 
 Takaful Model: Wakalah 
 Shariah contract for surplus sharing: Ju‟alah 
 Shariah contract for investment in PRF: Wakalah 
 Shariah contract for profit distribution: Not applicable 
 Combined distribution§§§ 
 
3. 
 
Takaful 
Operator C 
 
 Takaful Model: 1) Wakalah 2) Mudarabah 
 Shariah contract for surplus sharing: 1)Ju‟alah 2) Mudarabah 
 Shariah contract for profit distribution: 1)Ju‟alah 2) Mudarabah 
 Combined distribution 
 
4. 
 
 
Takaful 
Operator D 
 
 Takaful Model: Wakalah 
 Shariah contract for surplus sharing: Ju‟alah 
 Shariah contract for profit distribution: Wakalah bi al-Istithmar 
 Separate distribution 
 
5. 
 
Takaful 
Operator E 
 
 Takaful Model: 1) Wakalah 2) Mudarabah 
 Shariah contract for surplus sharing: Ju‟alah 
 Shariah contract for investment in PRF: Wakalah 
 Shariah contract for profit distribution: No specified contract 
 Combined distribution 
                                                          
‡‡‡ All tele-conversations with Shariah officers from respective Takaful operators on current market practice are not recorded. 
The information on market practice is also subject to accuracy of the respondents‟ replies and deemed true at the time of survey. 
The survey form is as attached in the appendix. 
§§§Takaful Operator B argued that underwriting surplus is not related directly to investment profit although obviously it is related. 
Thus, in researchers‟ assessment, the distribution will be regarded as combined distribution. This is also applicable to the same 
argument that has been made by Takaful Operator E. 
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No. 
Takaful 
Operator 
Practice of Takaful Operator in Regards to Surplus Sharing and 
Profit Distribution from PRF 
 
6. 
 
Takaful 
Operator F 
 
 Takaful Model: Wakalah – Ju‟alah 
 Shariah contract for surplus sharing:Ju‟alah 
 Shariah contract for investment in PRF: Ju‟alah 
 Shariah contract for profit distribution:Ju‟alah 
 Combined distribution 
 
7. 
 
Takaful 
Operator G 
 Takaful Model: Wakalah 
 Shariah contract for surplus sharing: HibahMu‟allaqah 
 Shariah contract for profit distribution: HibahMu‟allaqah 
 Combined distribution 
 
8. 
 
Takaful 
Operator H 
 Takaful Model: Wakalah bi al-Ujrah 
 Shariah contract for surplus sharing: Performance Fee 
 Shariah contract for profit distribution: Wakalah bi al-Istithmar 
 Combined distribution 
 
9. 
 
Takaful 
Operator I 
 
 Takaful Model: Wakalah 
 Shariah contract for surplus sharing: Ju‟alah 
 Shariah contract for profit distribution: Ju‟alah 
 Combined distribution 
 
10. 
 
Takaful 
Operator J 
 
 Takaful Model: Wakalah 
 Shariah contract for surplus sharing: Ju‟alah 
 Shariah contract for profit distribution: Wakalah bi al-Istithmar 
 Combined distribution 
11.  
Takaful 
Operator K 
 
 Takaful Model: Mudarabah 
 Shariah contract for surplus sharing: Gift**** 
 Shariah contract for profit distribution: Mudarabah 
 Combined distribution 
Table 1: Practice of Takaful Operatorswith regard to Surplus Sharing and Profit Distribution 
from PRF 
Out of eleven (11) Takaful operators, ten (10) of them practiced combined distribution. Below is 
the ratio between practice of combined distribution and separate distribution: 
                                                          
**** Takaful Operator K previously used the contract of hibah in distributing the surplus. After a discussion with their Shariah 
Committee, which  they then resolved that it has to be changed to a contract of gift because in hibah, there should be no condition 
that bind and tie the hibah.  
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. 
Diagram 4: Types of Distribution 
For surplus sharing, different Shariah contracts are applied as follows:  
i. Ju‟alah (used by eight (8) of eleven (11)Takaful operators) 
ii. Mudarabah (used by two (2) of eleven (11) Takaful operators) 
iii. Performance Fee (used only by one (1)Takaful operator) 
iv. HibahMu‟allaqah (used only by one (1) Takaful operator) 
v. Gift (used only by one (1) Takaful operator) 
The pie chart reflecting the contracts used are as below: 
. 
10
1
Types of Distribution
combined
separate
82
1
1
1
Shariah Contracts Used for Surplus Sharing
Ju'alah
Mudarabah
Hibah Mu'allaqah
Gift
Performance Fee
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Diagram 5: Shariah Contracts used for Surplus Sharing 
 
Obviously, ju‟alah is the preferred contract for surplus distribution. We also may consider 
performance fee to be regarded as ju‟alah because they are similar to each other.As 
forhibahmu‟allaqah (contingent hibah) as the underlying contract for surplus sharing, Takaful 
Operator G opined that the basis is what has been resolved by SAC of BNM in which SAC 
said
††††
: 
 دقاعتلابهامزتلااميههتجيتنونيدقاعتملاىضرلصلأا
“The original ruling for a contract is the consent of the contracting parties and its effect is 
based on what have become the rights and duties as agreed in the contract.” 
Hibah is a Shariah contract for granting ownership of an asset to another person without 
consideration. Hibahmu‟allaqah is a conditionalhibah whereby a donor will donate if the 
conditions are met. In sharing of underwriting surplus, Takaful participants (donor) will give up 
part of their underwriting surplus to Takaful operator (donee) only if the donee can realize 
underwriting surplus in that financial year. 
Althoughju‟alahand hibahmu‟allaqah differ based on their nature, actually the effect is 
still the same; Takaful operators are able to have a share of underwriting surplus. The reason 
why there are differencesin theShariah contracts adopted in this regard is because SAC of BNM 
only provides a general ruling on the matter as clarified above.  
Based on the above table as well, it is noted that there are Takaful operators that still use 
mudarabah contract in one of their models namely Takaful Operator A, C, E and K. 
Nevertheless, Takaful Operator E and K usesdifferent Shariah contract for their surplus sharing.  
                                                          
††††Shariah Resolutions in Islamic Finance 2010, p 79. 
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For distribution of profit (from PRF), different Shariah contracts are also applied as follows: 
i. Ju‟alah (used by four (4) of eleven (11)Takaful operators) 
ii. Mudarabah (used by three (3) of eleven (11) Takaful operators) 
iii. Wakalah bi al-Istithmar (used by five (5) of eleven (11) Takaful operators) 
iv. HibahMu‟allaqah (used only by one (1)Takaful operator) 
This can be visualized in the following pie chart: 
. 
Diagram 6: Shariah Contracts Used for Profit Distribution (Investment in PRF) 
From the diagram above, wakalah bi al-istithmar is the contract practiced by majority of 
the Takaful operators. It means that Takaful Operator B, D, E, H and J are being remunerated 
upfront to perform the investment management activities. While the second largest contract used 
isju‟alah, which is used by four (4) Takaful operators. 
4
3
5
1
Shariah Contracts Used for Profit 
Distribution (Investment in PRF)
Ju'alah
Mudarabah
Wakalah bi al-Istithmar
Hibah Mu'allaqah
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From this observation as well, it can be concluded that these four (4) Takaful operators are 
applying the same Shariah contract (ju‟alah) in profit and surplus distribution. This is likely due 
to the fact that most of theTakaful operators will channel the profit gained from investment in 
PRF back to PRF and regard it as part of surplus before being distributed. Only Takaful Operator 
D has separated the profit from surplus before being distributed. 
Most Takaful operators uphold wakalah as their Takaful model and use wakalah bi al-
istithmarin their investment in PRF. This is because wakalah bi al-istithmar will makeTakaful 
operator entitled to charge upfront fees. On top of that, the profit that emerged will be combined 
with underwriting surplus and subsequently distributed between the Takaful operator and 
participants on the basis of ju‟alah contract. 
Meanwhile, Takaful operators which uphold mudarabah as their Takaful model will also 
use mudarabah in their PRF investment. Nevertheless, there are Takaful operators that uphold 
mudarabah as their Takaful model but use wakalah in their investment in PRF. 
Based on the researchers‟ observation on the combined distribution, it is noted that there 
are three (3) different scenarios of distribution of profit and surplus from PRF as follows: 
i. Takaful operator that up holds wakalah or mudarabah as their Takaful model and applies 
wakalah bi al-istithmaras Shariah contract in their investment in PRF, 
ii. Takaful operator that up hold smudarabah as their Takaful model and applies the same 
contract as Shariah contract in their investment in PRF, 
iii. Takaful operator that up hold swakalah as their Takaful model and applies 
hibahmu‟allaqah as Shariah contract in their investment in PRF. 
 
Scenario i 
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For scenario i, Takaful operator up holds wakalah or mudarabah as their Takaful model 
and apply wakalah bi al-istithmaras Shariah contract in their investment in PRF. The profits that 
emerged from the investment will be combined with underwriting surplus and subsequently 
distributed between theTakaful operator and participants on the basis of ju‟alah.  
In the researchers‟ view, this practice is not accurate in terms of „adalah (justice), 
maqasidShariah (objectives of Shariah) and the fundamental contract. 
If aTakaful operator took wakalah charge upfront, they are no longer entitled for the profit 
of the investment. If they share the profit and surplus, it could be considered as double charge. 
So, 100% of investment profit must go to the participants‟ PIF and not to be returned to PRF. If 
not, it will be unjust to the participants. It is as if participants are forced to share their investment 
profit indirectly.  
It is also an obligation to the Takaful operator to ascertain that their earning is not through 
unlawful means based on one of objectives of Shariah which is to protect wealth. 
If a Takaful operator does not charge wakalah fee upfront and they share the profit via the 
combined distribution, it is not wakalah anymore; it would become another contract. It could be 
mudarabah(profit sharing) ormusharakah (profit and loss sharing). The Takaful operator should 
clearly spell out in the contract that the investment management activity is based on 
mudarabahor musharakahto reflect the actual or fundamental nature of the contract. 
 
Scenario ii 
For scenario ii, Takafuloperator upholdsmudarabah as their Takaful model and uses the 
same contract as Shariah contract in their investment in PRF. Hence, the investment profit should 
be distributed on the basis of mudarabah. 
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However, in Malaysia, SAC of BNM had previously passed a resolution on distribution of 
surplus which stipulates that any Takaful model that is based on mudarabah,its surplus can be 
shared by using mudarabahcontract. 
Nevertheless, fundamentally, mudarabah is actually a contract of investment by two 
parties; investment manager (mudarib) and capital provider (rabb al-mal). In Takaful context, 
participants are the capital provider whereby they put their contribution (capital) in PRF, whereas 
the Takaful operator is the investment manager. If the investment activities yield profit, Takaful 
operator can only share on the profit that emerged, not on the PRF as a whole. This is because, in 
mudarabah, the capital is still owned by the capital provider unless if there is a loss. 
Hence, if some monies remain in PRF at the year-end, it‟s not necessarily profit unless the 
remaining money is larger than the monies at the beginning of the year; it might not really be 
mudarabah because obviously they distribute the remaining capital in the fund not the profit. 
For example: The fund is started with RM100 million (capital). At the year end, the 
remaining money in the fund is RM50 million. Thus, RM50 million cannot be considered as 
profit because it is still a portion of capital. However, in this case, the money is considered 
mudarabah profit and subsequently defined as surplus. 
Thus, if there is really investment activity in the fund, the profit generated from it should 
be distributed separately between participants and Takafuloperator; it should not be mixed up 
with the capital (monies in PRF).  
 
Scenario iii 
For scenario iii, Takaful operator upholds wakalah as their Takaful model and applies 
hibahmu‟allaqah as Shariah contract in their investment in PRF. 
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Based on the assessment conducted, application of hibahmu‟allaqah for profit distribution 
from PRF is not accurate. This is because hibah is not an investment contract. In Shariah, 
investment contract is an exchange contract (aqd al-muawadah) and must be known, whereas 
hibah is charitable contract (aqd at-tabarru‟at). 
It would be more appropriate if the investment activity is based on mudarabahor wakalah 
bi al-istithmar whereby the profit emerged which is attributable to participants is channelled to 
their respective PIF. Only then, if there is surplus in the PRF, it can be shared betweenTakaful 
operator and participants based on hibahmu‟allaqah. 
 
Conclusion 
In researchers‟ view, neither contracts applied for the Takaful model nor contracts applied 
for investment activity are the real issue. The real issue arises when the investment profit and the 
underwriting surplus are combined together due to the reasons discussed.  
This is why researchers prefer to segregate between investment profit and underwriting 
surplus because this practice is more accurate, removes the prohibited elements in Shariah such 
as gharar(uncertainty) and jahalah(unknown) and evade double distribution of profit to the 
Takaful operator which is against the principle of  fairness („adalah).  
Double distribution occurs when the Takaful operator earns profit from upfront charge for 
investment management activities in PRF and also enjoys sharing of investment profit through 
surplus sharing from the same fund. 
It is advisable to all Takaful operators to revisit the implementation of surplus and profit 
distribution from PRF. May God help and guide us to ensure compliance in Shariah at all times. 
Wallahu‟alam 
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Appendix: 
Survey Form 
Great Eastern Takaful Berhad 
1) Which Takaful model that your institution adopt? 
Wakalah 
Mudarabah 
Other: _________________ 
2) Does your institution enjoy underwriting surplus? 
Yes 
No 
3) If yes, what is the adopted Shariah contract to distribute the surplus between Takaful 
operator and participants? 
Ju‟alah 
HibahMu‟allaqah 
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Mudharabah 
Other:_________________ 
4) Please give justification on above answer. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
5) Does your institution enjoy sharing of investment profit from participants’ risk fund? 
Yes 
No 
6) If yes, what is the adopted Shariah contract for the profit sharing? 
Mudharabah 
Ju‟alah 
Wakalah bi al-Ujrah 
Other: _________________ 
7) Please give justification on above answer. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
8) What happened to the profit from investment in participants’ risk fund?  
Profits will return to participants‟ risk fund and will be regarded as part of surplus 
Profit will be directed to participants investment funds accordingly; separated 
from underwrting surplus 
Other: ____________________________ 
9)  Any comments / questions? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Thank you 
 
